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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
4 November 1954

SUBJECT: The Post Election Political Situation in Honduras

Conclusions:

1. The Liberal Party, out of power for the last 20 years, has the support of the majority of the Honduran voters. Much of its support comes from the lower classes. It appears to stem in part from a growing popular conviction that past governments have not effectively tackled the country's basic social and economic problems.
2. Ranged against the Liberals are strong forces which may deny them electoral victory by juggling the election results or by violence.
3. The Nationalists, as well as the Liberals, have large enough congressional delegations to prevent the installation of Congress on 5 December by denying it a quorum. Such a maneuver might lead to Nationalist candidate Carias' selection as president by the Supreme Court or the breakdown of constitutional government and the continuation of President Galvez in office.
4. Violence could take the form of an attempted coup by the Carias forces if the Nationalists become convinced that their opponents are combining to defeat them in Congress. The odds are against the success of such an attempt and there is no evidence at this time that Carias is preparing to take such a course between now and the convening of Congress on 5 December.
5. Violence may occur among embittered Liberals if they are robbed of the election. Though the Liberals are not believed capable of a successful coup and party leaders appear genuinely anxious to avoid violence, the eruption of localized rioting among enraged party adherents is a possibility. In view of the wide popular support for the Liberals and the probable organized Liberal strength among the north coast workers, violence could be widespread and very serious.

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6. The greatest guarantee of peace is President Galvez, who has made every effort to assure peaceful elections and who enjoys the backing of most of the armed forces and wide popular support.

7. The Communists, already very active in the important north coast region, may gain whether a Nationalist dictatorship or a leftist Liberal administration comes to power in Honduras.

A. The Communists have long favored a Liberal administration, believing that they could infiltrate and influence such a government. In this they might be successful, since some Liberal leaders have in the past shown an apparent willingness to accept Communist support. However, many top Liberal leaders, who now have a strong and possibly dominant position in the party, are firmly anti-Communist and could be expected to follow such a policy if in power. In addition, the Guatemalan anti-Communist revolution of last June awakened many previously naive Hondurans to the dangers of Communism. In the long run, however, a Liberal administration would have to make an effective attack on the country's basic socio-economic problems if growing popular awareness of the inadequacy of previous regimes does not become channeled to the Communists.

B. Installation of Nationalist government might be more advantageous to Communist objectives in the long run than that of a Liberal administration. Carias considers all Liberals identical with Communists and his past methods suggest that he would persecute and repress the Liberal opposition. Many Liberals would then turn to conspiracy and attempts to foment revolution, which would render them much more susceptible to Communist infiltration and control. In Guatemala a strong dictatorship prior to 1944 did not prevent Communist activity which led after the dictator's fall, to the establishment of a pro-Communist government.

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A Nationalist government, based on less than a third of the popular votes in the 10 October elections, would be basically weak and might eventually be overthrown by an opposition then dangerously infiltrated by Communists. This eventuality might be somewhat lessened, however, if Carias could be convinced to permit the free participation in government by Liberal representatives.

Election Results: None of the three presidential candidates in the 10 October elections received the required absolute majority of votes. Congressional elections, held concurrently, also resulted in a stalemate with no party obtaining a majority in the new Congress. Since Congress is constitutionally charged with choosing between the two top presidential contenders, it is clear that some agreement between congressmen of opposing political parties must occur if constitutional government is to be maintained. The potentialities for violence are strong as deep antagonisms divide the three parties. Election results, in tabular form, are:

Party	Presidential and vice-presidential candidates	Percent of popular vote	No. of seats in Congress
Liberal	Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales (Enrique Ortez)	48%	23
Nationalist	Gen. Tiburcio Carias (Gregorio Reyes Zelaya)	31%	22
Reformist	Gen. Abraham Williams (Gen. Filberto Diaz Zelaya)	21%	<u>11</u>
			56

Of the three parties, the opposition Liberal Party, with 48% of the votes, clearly showed that it has the largest popular following. In a completely free election the Liberal presidential candidate, Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales, would probably have won over half the votes - enough to secure the presidency.

Aged ex-dictator Tiburcio Carias of the rightist Nationalist Party, who ruled Honduras with an iron hand from 1933 to 1948, obtained less than a third of the votes in his bid to regain the presidency. Nevertheless, as the runner-up, he continues to be a strong contender for the presidency.

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The moderate Reformist Party, which split from the Nationalist Party in late 1952 and then nominated General Abraham Williams for president, came in a poor third with only about 21% of the votes.

In the congressional voting, the Liberals also made a strong showing, but were denied victory in 20 contests in which they have won a plurality but failed to poll an absolute majority when the Nationalists and Reformists combined against them in the 24 October "review" of the votes. On that day municipal representatives met in each departmental capital to decide those congressional contests in which no candidate had received an absolute majority. In addition, a "recount" of the votes in one department in which the Liberals had been credited with an absolute majority resulted in victory for the Nationalist candidates. The Liberal majority in Congress may be even further reduced by future "revisions" or "recounts."

In spite of these developments, which the Liberals have characterized as "flagrant and sweeping abuse of the electoral machinery", and which, in contrast to the relatively free 10 October election, were characterized by widespread fraud and intimidation they will, according to the present count, have more congressional seats than either one of the other parties, though six short of the majority in the 56-member Congress.

If victory had gone to those candidates who received a plurality of the votes but not necessarily an absolute majority, the Liberals would have 46 seats in the Congress, the Nationalists 9, and the Reformists 1.

Constitutional procedure in Congress: When Congress convenes on 5 December to choose between the top two presidential contenders, an agreement between two of the parties must occur if Congress is to perform its function within the 20 days allowed it by the constitution. In the political bargaining which will take place in the weeks prior to the convening of Congress the Reformists hold the balance of power; agreement between the Nationalists and the Liberals is considered virtually impossible.

The alliance of the Reformists with the Nationalists against the Liberals in the 24 October voting by local officials on contested congressional seats may foreshadow continued collaboration between these two groups and possibly even the reintegration of the Reformists into the Nationalist Party. Such a combination would control 33 congressional seats according to the present count--four more than the majority required to select the president (29), but four under the quorum (38) needed to legally install Congress.

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This suggests the possibility that the Liberals, if they are faced with certain defeat, might boycott the Congress, thus preventing its installation. Such a move might lead to selection of the president by the Supreme Court, which is constitutionally empowered to do so by 1 January if Congress has not acted within a period of 20 days after 5 December. The Supreme Court is well known to be composed of Carias proteges. On the other hand, the absence of an effective Congress might lead to a complete breakdown in constitutional government, nullification of the election, and continuation in office by President Galvez. Current Liberal thinking, however, favors attending Congress even at the risk of permitting a Carias victory.

A Reformist-Nationalist coalition is by no means certain, however. One of the major obstacles appears to be strong mutual suspicion between the two candidates, Williams and Carias, and fear of Carias among the many prominent civil and military officials who backed Williams in the election.

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The Liberals and Reformists have discussed the possibility of a coalition but no firm agreement is known to have been yet reached.

[REDACTED]

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A Reformist-Liberal coalition would have 34 seats in Congress, one more than a Reformist-Nationalist coalition, but would still lack a quorum in Congress.

If an inter-party agreement is to result, there is a strong possibility that it may come only after one of the presidential candidates--Carias or Villeda Morales--steps down. The Reformists would be much more likely to coalesce with the Nationalists if Carias is replaced by a compromise candidate, and there is some reason to believe that Carias entered the race primarily to prevent the election of Abraham Williams. A compromise Nationalist candidate might be the capable current foreign minister Edgardo Valenzuela or present Vice-president Julio Lozano. Both these possibilities, however, are technically unqualified for election to the presidency because they are currently holding high office in the government.

Conversely, the Liberals may be forced to drop their candidate in any agreement with the Reformists. Villeda Morales is looked upon with suspicion by many Reformists, as well as by President Galvez, because of his past associations with alleged Communists. He is also opposed by a strong conservative faction in his own party led by Celeo Davila. The selection of a compromise candidate by either the Nationalists

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or the Liberals might well sufficiently reduce the campaign animosities to permit a solution of the seeming impasse.

Possibilities of violence and the position of the Army: Strong animosities among adherents of the three parties and the opportunities for fraud and intimidation inherent in the cumbersome electoral machinery render the current situation very susceptible to violence--and even to civil war. The period between now and the convening of Congress on 5 December is considered critical; and if no agreement has been reached by then, the immediately following weeks are likely to be even more critical.

The very popular President Juan Manuel Galvez, who seems to have done everything in his power to assure peaceful elections, may be forced to the conclusion that a temporary "dictatorship," nullification of the elections, and his own continuation in office, is the only way to prevent violence. It is believed, however, that he would take this action only with reluctance and then with some gesture toward democracy. He might temporarily resign with the expectation that the deadlocked congress would reinstall him in office for a specified period, after which new elections would be held.

The chief threat of an attempt to overthrow the government appears at this time to come from General Carias and his Nationalist Party followers. The danger of such a move would become acute if Carias should become convinced that the Liberals and Reformists were combining to deny him the presidency.

In any move against the government Carias might have the backing of military commanders in six of the country's 17 departments. Among these would almost certainly be the pro-Carias General Sanabria who has a tight grip on the Department of Colon. In addition, Carias is reputed to have a "private army" of several hundred at his disposal. His total armed strength might total 1000 men. Against this force would be arrayed the superior strength of the government. It is believed that President Galvez can count on the backing of the majority of the armed forces. The air force - a key element - is unquestionably loyal to Galvez and its 16 tactical planes could be decisive in a crisis. The commanders in perhaps ten of the 17 departments would probably back the president. Among the garrisons loyal to Galvez are the largest two -- that in the capital with about 500 men and the one in San Pedro Sula with 400.

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The army top command, though it lacks full control over the territorial units, is in a position to build up or weaken various garrisons over a period of time. The Chief of Staff, the young and ambitious Lt. Col. Armando Velasquez, is a leading Reformist. He is believed responsible for the recent strengthening of the large Reformist-officered garrison in the crucial north coast city of San Pedro Sula, at the expense of Nationalist-controlled units. [REDACTED] 25X1

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Though the Liberal Party probably does not have an organized force capable of a successful coup, it does have the capability of engaging in localized demonstrations of violence. The party's large popular following, demonstrated in the elections, suggests that violence by embittered Liberals could have widespread and very serious results. The party probably has significant organized support among the workers in the north coast region. The Liberal leadership, however, has appeared genuinely anxious to avoid violence.

The greatest guarantee against violence is President Galvez, who enjoys the respect of most of the army leaders and wide popularity throughout the country.

Possible Intervention by neighboring governments: Central American governments have frequently intervened in the affairs of their neighbors to secure the installation of governments favorable to their interests. This has often been justified as a means of self-protection. The present governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua both strongly suspect the Honduran Liberal Party of Communist leanings and favor the installation of a strong conservative regime under Carias. [REDACTED] 25X1


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The Costa Rican government of President Jose Figueres is openly in favor of the Liberals in Honduras. [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] The beleaguered Figueres regime, however, is probably now too concerned with its own problems to intervene in Honduras. [REDACTED] 25X1

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The Communist Potential: The Communists in Honduras are few and difficult to separate from the much larger group of ultra-nationalists, radicals, and disaffected elements within which they operate. The organization of a Honduran Communist Party has never been conclusively established; but it is nevertheless believed to exist. The evidences of Communist activity in the country have become increasingly apparent in the past year. Much of the support for Honduran Communism probably came from the pro-Communist Guatemalan government. With the fall of the Arbenz regime last June, the Honduran Communists have lost a valuable ally and base of operations.


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There are few clues as to the actual number of militant Communists in Honduras.

[redacted] there may be fewer than 100. There are perhaps another 300 sympathizers.

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The Communists in Honduras exercise a greater influence than their apparent small number would suggest. They do this generally by exploiting the growing popular awareness that past administrations and parties have not acted energetically to alleviate the economic and social problems of the country. Specifically, the Communists have gained influence by infiltrating and influencing labor and intellectual groups.

Greatest potential Communist strength appears to be among the workers in the vital north coast region. Here the Communists exploit wide popular discontent with the American-owned United and Standard Fruit Companies, which dominate the economy of the region. As early as 1951 they were operating a labor front group, the Workers' Coordinating Committee (CCO) which published a now defunct propaganda sheet Voz Obrera. It was in this area that an unprecedented general strike, which at one point affected nearly 40,000 workers, virtually paralyzed economic activity for up to 10 weeks last May and June. The organization and discipline suddenly shown by the strikers, who had no previous unions, was impressive and strongly suggested long preparation by Communist elements, probably with outside assistance. Before the strikes were settled, however, Communist strike leaders lost control of the workers and they have been unable to regain it in the major labor organizations which were formed after the end of the strikes. The inexperienced and often ineffective anti-Communist labor leaders, nevertheless, are still strongly challenged by a strong and apparently well-trained Communist minority which may yet seize control of the new unions.

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The Communists have also concentrated on influencing student and intellectual circles. The Alliance of Democratic Honduran Youth (AJDH), formed in 1951, is an affiliate of the international Communist front, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). While the membership of this group is believed small, it has successfully infiltrated and influenced the 500-member Honduran University Students Federation (FEUH), to which a majority of university students belong. In July 1954 Mario Alcerro Castro, a member of the AJDH and long a strident propagandist for Communist causes, was elected to the presidency of the FEUH. Alcerro had spent much of 1954 studying in Guatemala under the pro-Communist regime and attended the Communist-front "Regional Congress of Central American and Caribbean Youth for Peace and Friendship" in Guatemala in January. Alcerro replaced as president of the FEUH another Communist or pro-Communist, Rodolfo Rosales Abello, who had been jailed in June 1954 for attempting to foment a student demonstration in favor of the pro-Communist Guatemalan government. The university students' weekly tabloid, El Chilillo has been edited by a pro-Communist and frequently follows the Communist line. Leon A. Custodio, a prominent 23 year old member of the AJDH, spent six weeks in 1953 attending various Communist front youth and student conferences in Bucharest and Warsaw.

The chief vehicle of Communist political activity is the Honduran Democratic Revolutionary Party (PDRH), which apparently had its origin in 1945 among dissident members of the Liberal Party and has always had its main strength in the north coast area. The Communists, both Honduran and their Guatemalan advisors, appear to consider this party a "party of the petty borgeoise" which has among its members certain "progressive capitalists".

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The party's mouthpiece for several years was Vanguardia Revolucionaria, edited by Ramon Rosa Figueroa and managed by Gustavo A. Bulnes. This sheet was suppressed by the government in February 1953 and in the following December was replaced by a similar periodical, El Machete, edited by Bayardo Aguiluz.

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[REDACTED]

Few Honduran political leaders of any party have, at least until recently, shown a real understanding of Communist tactics and objectives. The Guatemalan anti-Communist revolution of last June, however, appears to have awakened many to the nature and dangers of Communism. All three of the major parties have taken an anti-Communist stand. Nevertheless, they have all, to some degree, used or attempted to use the Communists to further their own political advantage.

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The Liberals were very slow to disavow the support their party was receiving from the PDRH and to come out with an unequivocal anti-Communist stand. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Certain Reformist leaders suggested early in the campaign that they could "control" by post-election patronage any Communists who might join their campaign and, for a while, the known Communist sympathizer Armando Zelaya, was a member of the party's Supreme Council.

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The Liberal Party, and particularly the now-dominant radical faction of the party led by Villeda Morales, appears to be the most susceptible to Communist pressure and it may be infiltrated by Communists at lower party levels. The party probably gained some votes from the support tendered it by the Communist-front PDRH, though it may have lost more by refusing to take a strong anti-Communist stand early in the campaign. Villeda Morales [REDACTED]

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[redacted] has engaged in the past in some very doubtful associations with persons who, at best, can be classed as Communist sympathizers.

On the other hand, many Liberal leaders are prominent in the social and business life of the country and are innately strong anti-Communists. Many top Liberal leaders have assured the American embassy that, as soon as the party gets in power, it will move energetically against any Communists who might be found in its ranks. Shortly before the elections two top Liberal leaders made personal investigations of the Communist situation on the north coast and reported back to the capital their denunciation of Communist activity. On 14 October the Liberal Party issued an official declaration, over the signatures of the presidential and vicepresidential candidates, professing allegiance to the anti-Communist declaration of Caracas and favoring an international campaign against Communism. (The declaration was qualified, however, by the usual Latin American statement that such an international campaign should not have "interventionist" implications.)

If the Liberal Party is denied the electoral victory it believes it honestly won, many of its embittered adherents may turn to conspiracy and attempts at revolution. The opportunities for Communist penetration of a repressed and conspiratorial organization are much greater than in a freely functioning political party in an emerging democracy.

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Appendix no. 1

Background and Political Parties:

The six-year term of President Juan Manuel Galvez ends on 1 January 1955. Galvez was the hand-picked successor of former dictator Tiburcio Carias, who ruled Honduras with an iron hand from 1933 to 1948 and is now attempting a comeback. As president, however, Galvez refused to follow the dictates of Carias and has given the country an unprecedented degree of democracy. The easy-going likeable Galvez is probably the most popular president the country has ever had.

Galvez' demonstrated independence of Carias and the ambitions of leading politicians led in 1953 to a split in the ruling Nationalist Party between the moderates and those who remained loyal to the ex-dictator. The moderates at first advocated constitutional "reform" to permit Galvez' reelection to another term in the presidency. Faced with Galvez' sincere reluctance they formed a separate political party, the National Reformist Party. Mutual recriminations between adherents of the Nationalist and Reformist parties grew in intensity as the election campaign progressed.

The Liberal Party, one of Honduras' traditional parties, has been out of power since 1932 and was severely repressed during the Carias dictatorship. Nevertheless, many wealthy as well as middle and lower class families have been members of the party for generations and it had a solid base for a comeback when free to engage in political activity under the Galvez administration. The Liberals appear especially strong among the working classes. A month before the elections, the American embassy estimated that the Liberals had a greater popular following than either of the other parties and that, in a free election, they might even obtain over 50% of the votes.

With the approach of election day, the realization that any two-party coalition would be the probable victor and that a three-way race might result in a deadlock, led to attempts by leaders of each of the parties to reach an agreement with another. Reformists and Liberals were drawn together by mutual fear and hatred for Carias, Reformists and Nationalists by their former association and by common apprehension over alleged Communist influence in the Liberal Party. Conflicting personal ambitions and inter-party hostilities, however, prevented any agreement prior to the elections.

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After the unprecedented general strike in the north coast region last May and June, all three major parties sought to swing the newly-awakened labor vote to their side. The Liberals appeared to have the most success and the energetic and demagogic electoral campaign of Liberal presidential candidate Villeda Morales appeared particularly effective among the workers.

President Galvez took every precaution to assure free and peaceful elections. He refused openly to back any of the presidential candidates or parties. However, many of the president's closest associates, both in military and in civil posts, openly sided with the Reformists.

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Appendix no. 2

Liberal candidate, Dr. Ramon VILLEDA Morales:

The Liberal Party nominated the 46 year old physician Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales for president and the north coast druggist Enrique Ortez for vice president. Dr. Villeda, who represents the radical faction of his party, (as opposed to the conservative faction led by Celeo Davila), conducted a more vigorous and demagogic campaign than either of his rivals.

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[redacted] In the past his opportunism has led him to work with elements who, at best, can be classed as Communist sympathizers. During the campaign he was slow to disavow the support his party was receiving from the Communist-front PDRH and to attack Communism. When he finally took a public anti-Communist stand, however, it was a strong statement professing allegiance to the Caracas anti-Communist declaration. Other top Liberal leaders, many of them leading businessmen, have expressed strong anti-Communist sentiments and have declared their intention to rid the party of any Communists or Communist sympathizers.

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Villeda publicly and privately has denied that he is a Communist, but his basic ideas on government are unclear. In his campaign he emphasized the role of women (who have just recently been given suffrage -- too late to allow them participation in the recent elections) and promised the workers and underprivileged advanced labor and social legislation. In explaining his ideas on government, he uses the vague term "neo-liberalism" which he defines as the adaptation of the "new collective needs of society" to individual liberty, for which he professes respect. Perhaps the best clue to his ideas on government is the enthusiastic admiration he has expressed for Costa Rican president Figueres. When accepting the presidential nomination he declared his respect for foreign investments in Honduras - a sentiment which was also stated in the Liberal Party platform which he helped to draft. There is reason to believe, however, that he attempted during the campaign to exploit anti-United Fruit Company sentiment.

Villeda's cleverness in campaigning as a rabble-rouser is illustrated by his appearance at mass gatherings in unconventional shirt and coatless, whereas he is usually a very fastidious and formal dresser.

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Appendix no. 3

Nationalist Party candidate, General Tiburcio CARIAS Andino:

The 79 year old General Tiburcio CARIAS, dictator of Honduras for 16 years (1933-1949), is now attempting a comeback under the banners of his Nationalist Party. He rose to power as a successful military leader in many of the revolutions which characterized Honduras prior to his regime. He first became a decisive factor in Honduras politics in 1907 when a victorious revolutionary leader rewarded Carias, already a general, the post of military chief in the important north coast region. He became a presidential candidate for the first time in 1923. Heading the Nationalist Party ticket, he polled more votes than either of his opponents in that election, but lacked the required absolute majority. The electoral deadlock led to civil war. Carias became minister of government in the succeeding provisional government and in 1928 was defeated in his second bid for election to the presidency. In the relatively free elections of 1932, however, Carias won an overwhelming victory. In the interim before he and his vice presidential running mate, Abraham Williams, were inaugurated on 1 February 1933, Carias played a leading role in suppressing revolutionary uprisings in several parts of the country.

The 16-year Carias regime put an end to chaos and gave Honduras a greater and more prolonged stability than it had enjoyed at any time in its history. As president, undisputed chief of the Nationalist Party, and head of the army, Carias was almost unchallenged dictator. He was decidedly authoritarian in his methods. His administration at no time tolerated significant political opposition and frequently resorted to arbitrary arrest, imprisonment without trial, and censorship of the press and speech. Repression prevented any labor organization and the regime took virtually no steps to improve the status of labor. Special anti-Communist legislation was employed effectively against the non-Communist opposition. Much of the brutality and terrorism which characterized the Carias regime, however, was caused by undisciplined or over-enthusiastic party adherents. In comparison with other Caribbean dictatorships, such as those in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, Carias was a relatively benevolent dictator.

Although he was personally honest, Carias permitted considerable corruption by members of his inner circle.

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Twice Carias extended his term in the presidency by arbitrary methods but in 1948 he permitted the election of his chosen successor, Dr. Juan Manuel Galvez. Since leaving the presidency in 1949 Carias remained chief of the Nationalist Party and a powerful behind-the-scenes figure. Dissatisfied with the independence shown by his successor and fearful that the general relaxation of tight controls would lead to a return to anarchy and chaos, the old dictator determined to return to the presidency in the 1954 elections.

Carias, of predominately Indian lineage, is known for his stubbornness, his strong prejudices, and his terrifying fits of anger. On the other hand, he is a gentleman, kind and courteous, and his private life has been above reproach. In the countryside he has become almost a legend, chiefly because his is the best known name in the country and yet few of his countrymen have seen him; he seldom travels around the country and conducted his entire presidential campaign this year from the confines of his home.

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Appendix no. 4

Nationalist Party Vicepresidential candidate, Gregorio REYES Zelaya:

The 56 year old Reyes Zelaya has been Honduran ambassador in Mexico for the past ten years. An engineer by training, he is relatively unknown in Honduran politics, but his loyalty to General Carias is seldom questioned. During the election campaign he acted as General Carias' chief liaison man in several unsuccessful attempts to reach a coalition agreement with the Reformist Party leaders. He has indicated presidential aspirations to the American ambassador.

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Appendix no. 5

Reformist Party presidential candidate, General Abraham WILLIAMS Calderon:

Reformist Party presidential candidate, the 60 year old General Abraham Williams, is the greatgrandson of a Welsh immigrant. He was educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Union University, Schenectady, New York. After his return from the United States he engaged in private practice as a civil engineer for a few years but soon entered political life. He was governor and military commander of the Department of Choluteca in 1924 and 1925 and later a Deputy in the National Congress.

Williams was elected Vicepresident on the ticket headed by General Carias in 1932 and served in that post during the entire 16 year Carias regime. Toward the end of this period, however, he came into conflict with the dictator because of his opposition to the corruption and inefficiency which characterized the regime and because Carias refused to designate him as the official 1948 Nationalist Party presidential candidate. Carias, in turn, became convinced that Williams tried to assassinate him.

General Williams (his title is one of courtesy) has strong presidential aspirations and, realizing that his feud with Carias blocked his attaining presidency on the Nationalist Party ticket, he was quick to accept the Reformist Party nomination in 1954.

Williams is considered genuinely pro-United States and his ideas on domestic policies are believed moderate.

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